

Summary Of The Three Cases

The Truth Commission Files

A summary of the following three reports:

- The case "Olaf Palme" [Palme-report]
- The case "Dulcie September" [DS-Report]
- The case "Samora Machel" [Machel-Report]

I. The case "Olaf Palme"

Olof Palme, the Swedish premier and leader of the Social Democratic Part was an ardent opponent of apartheid. He was gunned down on a Stockholm street (Seavägen) on February 28, 1986.

Several leads were followed (victim of a police plot, the work of a Kurdish terrorist group or of a lone assailant with a grudge), but the police have never been able to solve the crime.

The journalist Per Wästberg told the Swedish police 5 days after Palme's murder that there could be a SA involvement, but the police seemed clearly not willing to investigate the SA trail.

Question: Why said (until today) the Swedish police all the time that the SA trail was not worth investigating? As we will see there were from the beginning some indications that the South Africans could have been involved in the Palme-murder:

1. A few days after the murder of Olof Palme. The British Intelligence, MI6, received a strange report: the man who had murdered Olof Palme had been acting under orders from the SA security police. Members of the death squad Koevoet, or COIN, were behind the murder. The SA agent, Craig Williamson, was mentioned as the designer of the plans to murder Palme, aided by Swedish police men.
2. At about the same time, Karl-Gunnar Bäck, the GS of the Civil Defence Force Association was contacted by an old acquaintance from England. He told him that the MI6 had information on the murder of Olof Palme. The informant claimed that Palme was murdered by (members of the) SA security forces. A Swedish policeman was also indicated (to have participated). Bäck recorded the information on a cassette and send it to Säpo (the Swedish security police) in Uppsala. Months passed by and nobody got back in touch with him. But late summer 1986 Bäck was suddenly informed that "the leads had been investigated and had led to nothing". Bäck was surprised. Säpo had never bothered to speak to him and hadn't even asked for his informant's name. It is now established that the Palme-investigators neither knew of the tape, nor whether or not the lead had been investigated. Säpo claims it is impossible to find the tape.
3. The Palme-investigators received another lead on involvement from SA together with Swedish accomplices. An informant, a known thug, who for the moment was serving a jail sentence, said that he was convinced that Swedish policemen helped SA agents in the murder of Palme. Some Swedish police men were members of the IPA, International Police Association. They ran a training camp in Rydsford and they had made several trips to SA where they had met with representatives of the SA security police The policemen and the IPA should also have had secret premises and

weapons at a meeting place in Wallingatan 32 (Stockholm), a few blocks from the crime scene. According to an informer these policemen were Nazis, bore arms while off duty and had frequent contact with South African agents. It was almost certain that the World anti-Communist League (WACL) had also an office in that same building.

4. After the assassination of Prime Minister Olof Palme, Bertil Wedin (or "Morgan" or John Wilson, here called BW) a Swedish right-winger, who in the past had worked for Craig Williamson, acted, according to Hasselbohm, as the initiator of the PKK-lead, which soon became the main lead in the search for Palme's killer.

This promotion of the PKK-lead was made more than three months before Hans Holmér, Stockholm chief of police and head of the Palme murder investigation, claimed for the first time that "PKK is behind the murder of Olof Palme." This became the investigation's main lead, with police chief Hans Holmér and Ebbe Carlsson as its promoter and lobbyist. A major police sweep of PKK sympathisers in Sweden followed but investigators later had to give up this lead.

Question: Was this PKK-trail a red herring, fed by Bertil Wedin, to conceal South Africa's role? I think it was. Because Wedin was blown after his appearance in court in 1982, it is unlikely that he was directly involved in Palme's murder. BUT indirectly it looks like he was: the creation of this false trail is probably the strongest indication that something is wrong here.

5. Heine Hūman (45), is allegedly a Swede of SA origin, who came to Sweden in the beginning of the 80's [Interview Tor Sellström]. To day he lives in Florida.

During the time of Palme's murder Hūman lived in some place outside Uppsala where he has some sort of car repair shop. Fourteen minutes after the murder of Palme an elderly couple in Stockholm (Bromma) received a mysterious phone call with the message: "The job is done, Palme is dead". With the only difference of one digit in the area code (Stockholm 08; Uppsala-area 018), their number corresponded to the number of a telephone in a room of a clubhouse of which allegedly only Hūman had the key. Hūman left Sweden in a hurry after the Palme. Swedish journalists have tracked him down in Florida (USA) where he lives under another name in a place outside Miami where a lot of American ex-intelligence people are retired too. Hūman denied any involvement in the assassination of Olof Palme.

In the past Hūman claimed to be a South African agent and that he had been involved in Dulcie September's murder. ANC intelligence officers interviewed him in Harare (Zimbabwe) but there were doubts about Hūman's claims. He might have done something, but his stories didn't make much sense.

6. There are also reports of three men who camped out in a white combi for some weeks before the murder. It was cold that winter, with snow on the ground, but to avoid registration, they did not stay in a hotel. The camping van is believed to have come from neighbouring Finland to the east and possibly drove out via Norway in the west. It was claimed that the men were South Africans.

7. Swedish newspapers claim that two policemen said that South Africa's superspy Craig Williamson was in Stockholm at the time of the anti-apartheid conference and was there also on the night of the murder. Through IPA Williamson allegedly hired a room (under a false name) in a guesthouse belonging to the IPA (Kammakargatan 36), down the road two hundred metres from the spot where Palme was shot.

8. The Swedish People's Parliament against Apartheid was organised by the Swedish anti-apartheid groups and announced a long time before it was actually held (from 21-23 February 1986). Among others the participation of Oliver Tambo, Thabo Mbeki and Abdul Minty of the ANC

was announced as well as that of representatives of the UDF and SWAPO.

- A possible scenario?:

It is imaginable that South Africans would be interested and moved in with some agents or even a hitsquad (see point 6). Craig Williamson who knew Stockholm well, would almost certainly be involved (see point 7).

Craig Williamson has said that "Sweden was badly worked and not well penetrated. So it was very much left to political contacts", which could only mean, with right wing groups in Sweden, who could function as a kind of local (sleeping) network (?? see point 3; perhaps men like Hūman and Wedin and their contacts).

- Although security would be tight (as indeed it was), it would be easy to keep track of the movements of persons like Tambo, Mbeki etceteras, because there were places they certainly would visit before, during or after this parliament: like the HQ of the Socialist Democratic Party (a place that Palme visited also regularly), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the SIDA-building, places in the Centre of Stockholm not very far from each other. - A week before Palme was killed, in the meeting where he was reading his prepared manuscript, he left his prepared speech and said: We are all responsible for apartheid. If the world wants apartheid to end, it could end to morrow by simply withdrawing support to the apartheid regime.' At that time it was a very revolutionary statement, which angered as well the Swedish extreme right as the South Africans.

- During this "Parliament"-period the local network and the hitsquad could have been activated against one or more of the representatives of the ANC, UDF or SWAPO (or even against Palme??). For some reason (tight security?) this plan is blown off.

- It might even that the local Swedish network than says, OK why don't you help us with something we want to be done. The whole operation was already mounted and they didn't succeed to do anything with Tambo and the others. Although the assassination of Palme is not in the prime interest of the South African's, they give their support to the local Swedes. (this is a hypothetical scenario discussed with several informants).

- With the centre of town under surveillance, it could be known that Palme, on the night of 28/2/86 dismissed his bodyguards and went to the cinema with his family. More or less two hours to organise the killing. With a structure already in place, not much of a problem. The perpetrator could be a hired contract killer, someone of the Swedish extreme right circles, a SA agent (White was mentioned) or even the bum Christer Pettersson.

- The police said the murder was too unprofessionally done to be the work of agents. But, how do you hide your trail, your cover up? Perhaps the best way, is to make it look like as an unprofessional job, hiding the people behind it. Police superintendent Hans Ölvbro thought that it was "improbable that a group could have organised itself so quickly", but above we showed how it could have been done.

9. Eugene de Kock mentioned Craig Williamson in his mitigation plea at Pretoria Supreme Court, as the one who had masterminded the assassination of Olof Palme in 1986. De Kock believed that the Swede Bertil Wedin living in Kyrenia North Cyprus, was the murderer (see above). De Kock said he learned of SA involvement in Palme's killing during a meeting "in 1992 or 1993" with Philip Powell, now an Inkatha Freedom Party (IPF) senator.

10. Former hitsquad leader Dirk Coetzee said Anthony White , also a founder member of Longreach was the killer of Palme. Williamson's military intelligence front Longreach was reporting

to Brigadier "Tolletjie" Botha. Coetzee first learned of the Palme link through a former agent in the Longreach outfit, "Riaan" Stander, a low ranking former security policeman. Stander made also these revelations to a Swedish journalist in 1995. He says White was assisted in the assassination by British "spy" Mike Irwin (British marines in Northern Ireland and the Falklands war) who also worked for Longreach. Peter Casselton (now dead) told the Swedish state television that White had nothing to do with the killing of Palme, and that the murderer was a European living in hiding somewhere in the Mediterranean.

Question: Why did Coetzee not come earlier with these declarations? He talked so much!

11. James Anthony White (50), former Selous Scout and once a ruthless killer for Ian Smith's Rhodesia. White moved to SA after Zimbabwe's independence in 1980.

White was a founder member of Longreach.

White was linked to both the South African and the Mozambican security services. White is running a furniture factory (a sawmill) on the outskirts of Beira in Mozambique. Mozambique's Frelimo government has sheltered White for years. White became close to Frelimo during the latter stages of the war against Renamo.

- White denied any involvement in the assassination of Olof Palme.

Motives:

1. ?? South Africa (a hypothesis): Swedes stood for more than 50% of the ANC's civilian budget in the 80's. Sweden was one of the countries that was pushing sanctions hardest and the first to carry them out (after 1985 -when it really started). But assassinating one person doesn't make much sense. The government (neither the conservative one) didn't change its policies towards South Africa.

2. ?? Swedish extreme right-wing groups (a hypothesis): They hated Palme. But to the extent that they wanted to kill him? Might be a possibility. It is very difficult to get information about these circles. But there is something that starts in Katanga and there are links to mercs in South Africa (see "Sweden"-report)It leads to Rhodesia, to the Seychelles-coup , to the World Anti Communist League and to UNITA and through that to Angola and Executive

Outcomes.

3. ?? A combination of 1 and 2 (see point 8)

4. ?? Work of a lone assailant who had some reason to wish Palme dead (the view of some police detectives)

5. ?? Other groups or organisations: Palme the victim of a police plot; of a Kurdish terrorist group; of the East German Red Army fraction; of Abu Nidal's Palestinian terrorist organisation; of the secret Iraqi secret service; of the KGB, the CIA/P2, Mossad and of international arms dealers.

Postscript 1997: Since the end of 1996 some new information was published:

- According to SAPA-AFP (16/2/97) new evidence pointed to Swedish killer in Palme murder. Chief public prosecutor Jan Danielsson rejected speculation about South African involvement in the murder, saying this theory had merely served to distract the police from "a more promising lead". No South African trail.

- According to "Independent on line" [24/7/97] The Maputo police arrested in 1997 (July), the SA businessman Richard Fair in connection with espionage and possession of illegal firearms. Fair co-owns a boat transport business with Swedish national Nigel Barnett. Fair admitted in a Swedish television interview, that he once flew into Mozambique with Barnett, Anthony White and Peter Casselton as the pilot. All three were named last year by Eugene de Kock and Dirk Coetzee as being involved with "superspy" Craig Williamson in the assassination of Prime Minister Olaf Palme. All have denied involvement in the assassination plot. Casselton died in February 1997. A police-investigation didn't shed new light on the Palme investigation.

II. The case "Dulcie September"

Bullets from a .22-calibre weapon (22 Long Rifle, with a silencer or "canon lisse") hit Dulcie September in the head as she stood, mail in hand, opening up the ANC office. Time: between 09.45 and 10.00 h. 28 Address: Rue des Petites-Ecuries, 4th floor, Paris-10

DS was the chief representative of the ANC in France (and also of Switzerland and Luxembourg).

Some of D.S.'s friends asserted that she knew she was being followed and threatened and that she had asked the ministry for protection which was not accorded.

The interior minister Charles Pasqua stated that D.S. never made any request for protection. However, already in December 1987, the French seem to have been informed by the Swiss authorities that South Africa was 'up to something', probably killing D.S. They warned the SA-embassy in Bern (the only European capital where an SA-military attaché was still permitted to be), that nothing must happen on Swiss soil. This information has been confirmed by two sources in the Swiss 'Bundesanwaltschaft', but officially denied. The sources also said that all western intelligence services knew about the SA-plans. It isn't known why the French didn't do anything about it.

Information about alleged perpetrators:

1. SADF Sergeant-Major Joseph Klue, who was positively identified by Godfrey Motsepe (ANC rep Brussels) as the man who took a shot at him, some weeks before D.S.'s murder (4/2/88). We doubt it, if Klue himself fired these shots. But he certainly could have been involved.

Klue was also suspected to be involved in the assassination of D.S. After the attack on Godfrey, the Belgian secret service informed their French colleagues about three involved SA-agents in Brussels, one of them has a name that begins with 'K'. The French didn't take any action.

Josep Klue lives in the Cape (SA) where he seems to be the owner of an ostrich farm. Belgian authorities issued an international warrant for the arrest of Klue. The TRC should have asked Interpol already a year ago to hand over his file. This wasn't done until very recently.

2. Dirk K. Stoffberg, arms dealer and a SA agent, was also named as the head of the a hit squad ('Z-Squad Incorporated') operating in Europe. Stoffberg always admitted to knowing details of this case. He arrived in France two days before the assassination of D.S.

Later -not long before his death- Stoffberg told Jacques Pauw that "he gave the orders for assassination of the ANC's Dulcie September (...). He said he paid two former members of the French Foreign Legion L 20 000 each to kill the ANC's chief representative in France. And Stoffberg said he had no idea why she was to be assassinated and presumed it was because she held a prominent position in the ANC.

3. Jean-Dominique Taousson:

Some French journals (as "Le Monde" and "Libération") mentioned the involvement of Taousson. According to the "Indian Ocean Newsletter" , this Frenchman made name during the Algerian war, when he was responsible for numerous attacks as a member of the "Delta commandos" (a death squad) of the underground anti-independence "Organisation de l'Armée Secrète"(OAS).

This same newsletter revealed in an earlier issue in 1985 that the Paris bureau of Pretoria's NIS had "received orders to organise attacks against missions of the ANC and the South-West Africa People in France and elsewhere in Europe. For this purpose the NIS began to form hit-squads (as did for example Stoffberg & Klue), recruiting among mercenaries, the security services of extreme-right movement and veterans of the South African army's own 32nd Battalion, many of whom were French." According to the ION Taousson had been given the job leading this recruiting campaign, as well as collecting full information on the targets. Taousson had extremely good contacts with the European right-wing.

Taousson was bitterly opposed to the ANC: he had been the chief-editor of the pro-South African newsletter 'Courier Austral Parlementaire' (published by a Paris based organisation ADERI see Notes *3). His newsletter was distributed to members of the European and French parliaments and it was set up with help from the South African authorities. In 1981 Taousson became the head of the photography service in the election campaign headquarters of the RPR, the Gaullist party of Jacques Chirac and Charles Pasqua. These elections were lost, but in 1986 the Chirac government took over. Shortly after these legislative elections of March 1986 Taousson was appointed a technical adviser on the personal staff of interior minister Charles Pasqua, where he was in charge of highly-sensitive matters like New Caledonia and relations with Algeria. Taousson being opposed to the ANC having a representation in France, is said to have given 'strict orders' to the relevant service not to renew Dulcie September's residence permit which would expire in October 1987. However, DS succeeded in having it extended for a further year by applying not to the authorities in Paris but to those in the suburban "département" of Val de Marne, whose prefect had been appointed while the previous socialist administration was in power.

When French newspapers wrote that Taousson had also been the recruiter for the murder of Dulcie, he sued them with success. But it is known that DS was harassed from the moment that the Pasqua government (1986) came into power in France: Taousson threatened DS that she would be expelled if she wouldn't cease public activities and he had the new ANC-office monitored. But, there is no evidence that Taousson himself has contacted people for attacks on ANC. It seems unlikely, that a publicly known SA-propagandist working officially with the French government, would be directly involved in an undercover-operation, but he certainly played a role in the harassing of Dulcie on an official level and probably also passed on intelligence information.

4. Heine Hüman, allegedly a Swede of SA origin could be an interesting witness. According "Vrije Weekblad" he said: "I helped to murder Dulcie"and claimed to have participated in the planning of D.S.'s murder. Hüman told them that he had worked for the Security Branch of the SAP (section A1: external security operations) and that he had fetched Dulcie's hitman at Heathrow-airport. [see Palme-report].

5. Eben Barlow seems at the time of DS's assassination to have headed the CCB's Western Europe region. He operated out of Frankfurt (Germany). D.S.'s assassination was according to Ellis almost certainly directed by Barlow as CCB desk officer for Europe.[Int.Ellis]

Eben Barlow seems to deny this, although an informant told me that Barlow allegedly once received an order to kill Dulcie September, but that his section refused because DS wasn't a military target. The TRC should nevertheless question him.

6. Comoro-link: the Comoros were effectively run by mercenaries in close alliance with France and South Africa:

a) According to 'a French investigative magazine, the assassination of D.S. was personally set up by a French mercenary, Capt. J.P. Dessales, who later served in the Comoros (as a member of the presidential guard) with Col. Bob Denard.

b) In the beginning of 1988, an ex-Rhodesian mercenary based in Paris, goes to the Comoro Islands to undergo some kind of training for 'special operations'. There is talk about more mercs going the same way.

c) A much more complete picture about the Comoros-link is given in the official French document "Ordonnance de Non-Lieu" [Non-Lieu]. According to this document, the French police (Brigade Criminelle) suspected at a certain moment that a French mercenary, named Richard Rouget could have played a role in DS's murder, but no hard evidence could be produced to arrest neither him nor other members of his group who allegedly had been working for the South Africans. This Rouget directed a group doing reconnaissance missions on the

ANC in Europe.

Concerning the Crime Motives:

1. The answer probably related to military links between France and RSA (Armcor particularly) France important illicit supplier of essential parts and materials to Armcor. Fact that France almost alone of major western European countries had no powerful anti-apartheid movement facilitated these clandestine links. There were signs that September was putting together an effective anti-apartheid lobby. Thus a threat; thus a hit.

The reality was probably a bit more complex (see the Report itself). Dulcie September probably heard something about these weapon transactions from somebody inside a French arms industry (we don't know who, yet). Just before her death she phoned Aziz Pahad (then ANC-HQ) in London, asking him to come to Paris for a very sensitive matter. Aziz thought that Dulcie "had stumbled on something nuclear". Dulcie had also said that she feared for her life.

Although there have been suggestions that members of the French secret service were directly involved in the murder of Dulcie September and especially some belonging to Pasqua's network (see Jean Taousson above), we don't think that the French they themselves planned or executed this murder. More probably they created in 1988 some space for SA agents to eliminate DS, as a kind of spin-off of the ongoing weapon deals. But they probably lend a helping hand (surveillance etc.).

2. Perhaps part of the fifth phase (+/- early 1985 - first quarter of 1988) of South African's regional policy (...) marked by increased activity of death squads. See: Alby Sachs, Godfrey Motsepe etc. In August 1985 the Indian Ocean Newsletter revealed that the Paris bureau of Pretoria's National Intelligence Service, which had a staff of ten and was allegedly headed by a woman (who ??), had "received orders to organize attacks against missions of the ANC and SWAPO in France and elsewhere in Europe. For this purpose the NIS began to form hit-squads, recruiting among mercenaries, the security services of extreme-right movements and veterans of its own army. Those operations planned in 1985 had to take place in early 1986.. Apparently DGSE (French intelligence) stopped it then, but in 1988 the 1986-scenario was used. [G&D-doc]

3. There were also a lot of false tracks and smear campaign, like for example that the killing of D.S. was because of an 'internal struggle' within the ANC. Opinion stated by the French minister M.

Robert Pandraud (ministre délégué chargé de sécurité), by the SA Minister of Information Stoffel van der Merwe and Pik Botha (SA minister of foreign affairs). D.S. was a turned South African double agent, and therefore "liquidated by the militant communist faction of the ANC"..

Concerning the chain of command: Such a murder must have been cleared at very high levels:

SSC or Min.of Def. Malan. We believe that such an operation in a major western European capital had to be cleared at very high levels; at least SSC or Ministry of Defence (then Malan). If so, this assassination could have been directed by Eeben Barlow, at that time the CCB desk officer for Europe. General Marius Oelschig, as a Senior Military Representative must have had some knowledge of this affair.

Mr. De Crepy (commercial agent) was the only witness. He saw at about 09H45 two men (whites) of about 40 years old, coming down the staircase and leaving the building where the ANC had its office [G&D; Non-Lieu: 2]. De Crepy confronted with photographs of Klue and Rouget didn't recognise none of these two as one of the two men he had seen.

III. The case "Samora Machel"

Date air crash (with a Tupolev 134A jetliner): Sunday night 19/10/1986, shortly after 21.00 hrs Machel's plane travelling from Lusaka (Zambia), over Zimbabwe and Mozambique to Maputo crashed in South African territory, into a hillside belonging to the Lebombo mountains in the Mbuluzi area, the corner of the eastern Transvaal, near the junction of the Mozambican, Swazi and South African borders.

According to the CVR transcription, at 21.11 and 28 seconds the captain said "making some turns. Couldn't it be straight?" The navigator replied "VOR (Very high frequency omnidirectional radio) indicates that way", signifying that he believed the plane was following the VOR signal transmitted from Maputo airport. In fact, the Tupolev made its fatal turn towards the SA border because it was following signals of a VOR which was not that of Maputo.

Victims: President Samora Machel and 33 others died, 10 survived

?? Crime activity:

Facts: The International Commission of Inquiry's technical and factual report was signed by the three members of the International Commission (Mozambique, the Soviet Union and South Africa). The report written by experts is essentially a technical and factual description of the flight of the Presidential aircraft on 19 October 1986. It speaks of the crew, the aircraft instruments, the fuel, the altitude, Maputo airport, air traffic control operations, the air traffic control operator who was on duty on the night, the autopsies carried out on the dead, the site of the crash, the position of the wreckage and so on.

It concluded, based on the evidence of the 'black box' Cockpit Voice Recorder, recovered from the wreckage, that the crew of the Presidential aircraft, a Soviet built Tupolev 134 made a fatal turn to the right away from its correct flight path, because they were following a radio beacon (a VOR - a very high frequency omnidirectional radio) which was not that of Maputo. They believed that this was the Maputo airport, and the instrument panel of the plane showed that at least one of the navigational dials was set for the correct Maputo frequency.

The report states that the pilots were sober and were physically capable of carrying out their duties, that they were of proven competence, and that the weather conditions of the night of 19 October were not unfavourable.

What VOR this was, and whether it was genuine or a decoy, was never identified.

Two hypotheses:

-1 ?? Planned Air crash; hypothesis that President Samora Machel's Tupolev 134 aircraft was diverted from its correct flight path by outside electronic interference with its navigational instruments. Electronic deception could be carried out by a false emitter of beacon which is pre-positioned. Israel has build up considerable experience in electronic deception techniques and once the technique of directing the beam is mastered, the process becomes very simple. Since SA enjoys close military and other relations with Israel, there would be no problem in Pretoria being provided with all the relevant and know-how [Minty]

President Joaquim Chissano said in June 1987 that President Samora's death was no accident. No formal accusation has ever been made. There remain many unanswered questions.

-2?? Hypothesis that the crash might have been caused by pilot error. The weather was bad and cloud cover was heavy (not true: there was a slight increase in cloud cover, but visibility remained good) The aircraft, which would have been alright if it had been on the approach to Maputo was also at too low an altitude over the rugged border country where Komatipoort is at 8,000 feet.

A South African 'Board of Inquiry' under Judge Cecil Margo proclaimed the crash an accident and blamed the Soviet Crew, claiming that the plane had locked on another VOR which they had mistaken for Maputo. At the hearing under his chairmanship the SAns tried hard to argue that the plane had locked on the VOR at Matsapa airport, near Manzini in Swaziland and the only legitimate VOR which could conceivably have been mistaken for Maputo. But the Matsapa and Maputo VORs operate on quite distinct frequencies, and one of the VOR dials among the instruments of the wrecked plane showed, according the SA Bureau of Standards, cited in the factual report, the correct frequency for Maputo- namely 112.7 Mhz. The crew had also flown in and out of Maputo dozens of times, making over 70 per cent of their landings by night. They were thus well-acquainted with the frequency of the Maputo VOR, and very unlikely to switch to another VOR by mistake. Certain technical details also rule out Matsapa. Question: Could there have been another powerful competing transmitter in Swaziland strong enough to lure the aircraft into wrong trajectory? The US-station in Swaziland perhaps?

??Crime motives:

??-1 President Samora Machel was 'a major target' of SA and accused, 2 weeks before the crash, of renewing support for ANC rebels. Pretoria banned the new migration of Mozambican workers into SA. In the weeks before the crash the SAN government had conducted a prodigious destabilization campaign against Mozambique. On 7 October Defence Minister Gen. Magnus Malan threatened the Mozambican leader personally.

The unusually vitriolic tone of SA criticism of Mozambique and of Machel, especially by military spokesmen, gives credence to theories that the SA government got tired of Machel and wanted him gone.

Mozambique was at a critical moment in the struggle: Renamo had started a huge offensive and threatened to cut Mozambique in two parts. The SA leadership believed that the Mozambican government was on the verge of collapse.

According to former Mozambican Minister Cabaço there is no sufficient proof that SA murdered President Samora Machel, but personally he believes that they were responsible for his death and well for the following reasons:

1. on the Wednesday before the death of Samora Machel, Carlos Cardoso director of AIM agency received a message that the President had died.
2. before leaving for Lusaka Samora Machel organized a meeting with journalists, the party leadership and the military. He told them that he had received information that the SAnS wanted to kill him. He gave clear instructions what to do if he wouldn't come back.
3. SA wanted to get rid of Samora Machel for the following reason:

Under pressure of some presidents of the frontline states, President Banda was forced to expel the Renamo soldiers who used Malawi as a springboard for attacks on Mozambique. Banda complied with the demands of the frontline states' leaders, but allowed Renamo to cross into Tete and Zambezia province. Renamo mounted a huge offensive in Zambezia (where Frelimo had few troops at his disposal), and approached the city of Quilimane, trying to split Mozambique in two parts and to provide Malawi with an outlet to the sea.

The SAnS expected that the death of Samora Machel would cause a power struggle in Maputo and that no Mozambican troops would be sent to counter the Renamo offensive, until the leadership crisis would be over.

According to Cabaço, the SA strategy failed: a) there didn't break out any power struggle and Joaquim Chissano was immediately elected to succeed Samora Machel as the new president; and b) a military force was sent to Zambezia province to counter the Renamo offensive on the exact day fixed by Machel and his generals).

??-2 No crime, just a genuine accident: the death of Machel, one of the few frontline politicians who was ready to sign a treaty with SA, simply could not be in SAn interest. According to "Africa Confidential" Even leaders of the ANC in Lusaka privately worked on the assumption that the crash was not due to SAn action. Suggestions that the SADF used complex electronic methods to confuse the pilot of Machel's plane or make the controls malfunction seem fanciful. It seems an unnecessarily complicated way of bringing down an aircraft. If true, it would risk exposing in public gaze military technology which is not available even to superpowers and which, if it exists, could change the world's military balance.

Chain of command: If no accident, it was planned on a very high level (certainly Malan etcetera)

Witnesses:

1. The only surviving member of the Soviet crew Vladimir Novosselov [Komsomolskaya Pravada 19/11/86] said in an interview: "I am convinced that it was not an accident, but a case of foul play. The Soviet crew of the presidential plane was highly experienced. The pilot. Yuri Novodran, had been flying for 25 years. The other crew members- co-pilot Igor Kartamichev, navigator Andrei Kudriachov and radio operator Anatoli Choulipov - were also very experienced." "At about six o'clock in the evening, the President came to Lusaka (...). The plane gained the necessary height and headed towards Maputo. When we were flying over Zambia the altimeter showed 11,400 metres. When we crossed the Mozambican frontier the Tupolev descended to 10,600 metres. Novodron ordered contact to be made with Maputo airport requesting authorization to land. The airport services granted the request. Weather conditions were favorable for the flight. Maputo was ahead and to the left of the left of the pilots. To the right and very close was the Mozambique-South African border. We were gradually descending. The altitude was 5,200 metres. Then we dropped to 3,000 metres. We were 113 kilometers away from Maputo. Novodran switched off the autopilot and took over the manual controls. He was an excellent pilot. Even navigator Kudriachov and radio operator Choulipov, who have spent around 14,000 hours in the air, did not know a more

experienced captain than Novodran. We descended to less than a thousand metres. The last thing I remember was that the altimeter was reading 970 metres, after that nothing."

2. Machel's bodyguard Fernando Maniel João, the survivor with the least serious injuries, searched for help. At midnight he managed to contact the Komatipoort police from the phone of a missionpost. He asked them to contact Mozambique about the crash, but in fact the Mozambican government was only officially informed of the disaster by the SA authorities at 6.50 on the Monday morning.

Another survivor Almeida Pedro said that the SA police appeared on the scene of the crash at about 2.00 in the morning of Monday 20 October (four and a half hrs after the crash). The police "didn't go to the aid of the people who were crying out. There were people who died for lack of assistance" and Mr. Pedro said he saw "all of them collecting papers, diplomatic bags, dollars. They took lots of things." This was confirmed by Mr. João: "the South Africans were not at all concerned with the lives of the wounded. They were just messing around with the other things there". He said he became angry with the South Africans for "refusing to take the wounded to hospital". He spoke with a police inspector who finally ordered helicopters and medical staff to come and take the injured to the hospital in Nelspruit. The first of the injured arrived at Nelspruit at 8.00 am, almost 11 hours after the crash.

More questions:

- Although the Tupolev entered a military and operational zone (a "special restricted airspace") which was under 24 hour radar surveillance by a very sophisticated defense system (the Plessey AR-3D computerized radar system, integrated into the air control and command system by 1982) no warning was given that the plane was off-course and entering SAn air space. Neither that the mountains presented a threat to the aircraft. No preventive action was taken, although according to the Jo'burg paper 'Business Day', quoting a SA government source, the Mozambican President's plane had been tracked on SA radar for hundreds of kilometers, even while it was over Zimbabwe. Yet no warning was given.

Question: Why didn't the SA air control warn the pilot of President Samora'_ Tupolev 134 that he was off course and in danger of entering SA air space?

-During this period there was a major military build-up in the eastern Transvaal, including the despatch to Komatipoort of Reconnaissance Commandos, the favoured instrument of long-range incursions. On the day of the crash, there was already a full military alert in north and east Transvaal and the South African authorities admit that their radar tracked Machel's aircraft.. SA troops were suspicious slow to arrive. Question: where were the South African troops?

-The factual report of the International Commission of Inquiry read out at the SA hearing states that during the on-site investigation an abandoned campsite was found on the SA side of the border approximately 150 metres southeast of the place where the aircraft initially contacted the ground. Witnesses on Mozambique-side of the border informed that a tent on the site had been removed on the day after the accident."The company commander of the army unit in the Komatipoort area has no knowledge of any camps with large tents in the particular area."

Question: What was this mysterious campsite near the place of the crash?

-South African behaviour in the immediate aftermath of the crash was also suspicious:

The police was there first (02.00 hrs. on 20 October), then medical help by 06.00 hrs, 4 hours or more after the arrival of SAn police on the scene. The Pretoria authorities waited for 9 hours (until

06.50 hrs. the following morning to get the word to Maputo. Even then, the Mozambicans were told that the crash had taken place in Natal, some 200 kilometres away from the actual site in the Transvaal.

Eyewitnesses claim that the police checked with those still able to talk that the wreck was the presidential plane, and then ignored the injured and immediately set about collecting documents.

Question: The SA knew whose plane it was, they knew exactly where and when it crashed -yet they didn't inform the Mozambican authorities until nine hours after it had happened. Why?

Question: Why, when the police arrived on the scene, did they busy themselves with the documents scattered among the wreckage rather than with helping the wounded?

- According to the "Mozambican Medical Commission" persons currently unknown

interfered with bodies of six of the 35 who died when the aircraft smashed. Six of the bodies were found to have incisions, already stitched up, on the sides of the neck. The incisions, about seven centimetres long, were made with a sharp instrument on one or other side of the neck along the line of the cleido mastoideo muscle. It was not possible to establish the precise time at which the incisions had been made, but the interference with the bodies took place either at the site of the crash, or on the journey between Mbusini and Komatipoort. (...) These cuts were not the cause of death. The SA Prof. Nel advanced the theory that the cuts had been made to collect blood samples, but declared also that it was not normal procedure.

Question: Why this interference with the crash victim's bodies and by whom?

- A flow of disinformation then began: the Soviet flight engineer, who had been at the rear of the aircraft, was described as the pilot (...) Then reports were circulated (Pik Botha) that there were minute quantities of alcohol in the blood of the navigator and radio reporter, suggesting that, the vodka-loving Soviet pilots had been drunk on duty. Such quantities are however produced naturally in decomposition. SA Foreign Minister Pik Botha spoke also of the aircraft as "dated and obsolete", claiming it was not equipped "with an automatic ground proximity warning system to warn pilots should they descend below a certain altitude." A claim categorically rejected. The presidential aircraft, a Tupolev 134 was manufactured in 1980. It carried 'electronic equipment of the current generation, using integrated circuits, and with a design improved and updated for this technology'.

Botha commented that the Mozambican authorities had launched their search for the missing aircraft out to sea. In fact, it was conducted both on land and at sea; such searches are normally made over a large area both to the left and right of the presumed flight path. Later Pik Botha admitted that he had made some false statements "to alleviate and minimize the very dangerous effect of the allegations being made against our air force, the SA government and unnamed SA agents".

Question: If the Pretoria regime is really innocent of the plane crash, what need did it have to launch a lot of disinformation.

Amsterdam Nov. 1997

The (secret) Truth Commission Files