

# The Case Of “Godfrey Motsepe”

## The Truth Commission Files

### [GM-report]

**Case: Godfrey;**

**Date: 1987-1988;**

**Place: Brussels, Belgium**

**Name Victim: Godfrey Motsepe**

**Address Victim: ANC office: Raadstraat 25, Brussels, Belgium**

**Sex Victim: M;**

**Race' Victim: Black;**

**Age Victim: Adult**

**Position Victim: ANC representative in Brussels for Belgium and the Netherlands. Motsepe had in been posted in Brussels for 8 years (from 1980?).**

### Information Victim:

The Belgian authorities have refused for years to allow a second ANC representative to join the Brussels office, and have during this time granted Motsepe only preliminary refugee status, to be renewed yearly.[SS-28]. Motsepe asked the authorities several times for protection which was not accorded.

### Perpetrator:

Godfrey Motsepe positively identified Joseph Klue (see Notes-1; see also Dulcie September case) as the man who took a shot at him. I (KdJ) doubt it, if Klue himself fired these shots, but he certainly could have been involved (see Notes-2).

### Perpetrator Information:

1. SADF Sergeant-Major Joseph Klue [Pauw,1991:208,281]. Klue had served as a defence attaché at the South African Embassy in London until 1982, when the British government threatened to expel him for "activities incompatible with his office" and he was recalled to Pretoria. Klue was named in an Old Bailey trial in London in connection with a plot to burgle the offices of black nationalist movements in Britain and steal documents from them.[Pauw:208]. According to some information he has been the assistant to the MID's chief of operation in France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the Benelux countries - Gen. C. van Niekerk [WA 1/8/88]. More likely it was General Marius Oelschig. During the period 1987-1990 Oelschig had MI responsibility for France and Belgium [CV Oelschig].

L'Express (Paris, 8-6-88) stated that Belgian intelligence identified Joseph Klue of the NIS as the person who shot at the ANC representative in Brussels, Godfrey Motsepe and that he is probably also involved in the assassination of Dulcie September [Intel/pp 88 07]. Belgian authorities have issued an international warrant for the arrest of Klue [Pauw:208].

2. During this period a group of a French mercenary , named Richard Rouget, was active in Europe. This group allegedly was doing reconnaissance missions for the South Africans on the ANC. The French police (Brigade Criminelle) suspected that they could have plaid a role in the attack on

Godfrey Motsepe and in the murder of Dulcie September. However no hard evidence could be produced to arrest neither Rouget nor other members of his group. Rouget was based in South Africa but the head of his group in Europe (Tran-Thuy Tuong, alias Victor, alias Paul Tramond) was based from 1985 until December 1987 in Brussels. Tramond worked during this period as a receptionist at the Sheraton Hotel (see Notes \*3) [Non-Lieu].

#### Crime Activities:

1- 1987: two men directly threatened Godfrey Motsepe. One of these was armed with a pistol equipped with a silencer (SS-28); petty sabotage (letters vanishing in the post or arriving torn up in the letterbox of the ANC office)

2- 4/2/88 (or 5/2??): 2 Shots fired through the window of the room in which Godfrey Motsepe was working. The shots narrowly missed him, although his ear was cut by splinters.

3- 27/3/88 a 17kg bomb is discovered at the office of the ANC in Brussels (2 days before the murder of Dulcie September in Paris (see case Dulcie September) .

#### Crime Result:

See Crime Activity:

ad 2: Motsepe missed being hit.

ad 3: A suspect bag was discovered near the ANC office entrance. After evacuation of the whole densely populated quarter Belgian police and bomb experts carried away the 17 kg device, which could have caused heavy damage. It would have been an 'overkill'

#### Crime Motives:

??Attacks part of a pattern of attacks and acts of terrorism. (See also the Dulcie September case) Part of 'the 5th phase of SA's regional policy (...) marked by increased activity of death squads'.[Pauw, 1991:207].

??The Belgian capital Brussels, as an EEC centre and in a country with a large pro-Pretoria political lobby (Protea), and far right-wing groupings (Vlaams Blok), is a high-profile centre for the ANC's information office.[SS-28]

?? Racist action by right-wing Belgian persons/groups linked to the Vlaams Blok in cooperation with SA agents like for example Klue or on their own initiative.

#### Chain of Command:

Speaking about the murder of Dulcie September Stephen Ellis [Int.Ellis] believed such an operation in a major western European capital had to be cleared at very high levels; at least SSC or Ministry of Defence (then Malan). The same could be true for this case. If so, this assassination was almost certainly directed by Eben Barlow as CCB desk officer for Europe (Notes-4) General Marius Oelschig, as a Senior Military Representative must have had some knowledge of this affair.

Witness: Godfrey Motsepe

Witness Information:

The evening of Thursday 4/2/88 I was alone in the office (Raadstraat). Somebody ringed at the door and asked through the intercom, in faulty French, for an interview. He claimed to be from 'La Libre Belgique'. I got suspicious (journalists mostly phone first to make an appointment) and told him to go away. The man got aggressive. I got curious and walked to the window on the ground floor.

I saw the figure (in winter clothes: anorak, wool-cap) near the window. He was staring inside. I could see his face very well. I turned around and at that moment I heard an enormous crack. I ducked.

There was some blood caused by splinters. I phoned the police who came in less than 8 minutes. They found two points of impact, I thought that I had heard only one shot.

Later the police told me that the shots were fired with a Russian pistol. Police investigations revealed that nobody from the newspaper had been sent to see me. The same night we made, with experts, a robot photo of the man I had seen. Some days later (7/3/88) the "Rijkswacht" (Belgium state police) showed me a real photo of this man. With 98% certainty I can say it was him. The police (names: Mr. Six and Mr. Gobert of BOB-Brussels=Belgian Detective Division of the 'Rijkswacht') asked me not to inform the press. Since then I didn't hear anything from them. And then came the bomb, found by another tenant. [DM:30/3/88; 26/10/88]

Notes:

1. Godfrey Motsepe had recognized as the alleged perpetrator a photograph of Joseph Klue. At the beginning of March 1988 the British police informed the GIA (Belgian anti-terrorist coordination group) about the identity of the South African agent Joseph Klue. The GIA informed the BOB-Brussels (Belgian Detective Division). On the 10/3/88, the state police informed the office of the public prosecutor, probably to gain all the credit. However, other anti-terrorists units or the judicial police were not informed, neither in Belgium nor in the neighbouring countries. Only one day after the murder of Dulcie September (30/3/88) the GIA alerts the other services [De Morgen 3/10/88], but only after the French 'Brigade Criminelle' in Paris had contacted the GIA (on the 29/3/88) for transfer of information concerning the attacks in Brussels and Paris. On the 12/4/88 Interpol issued an international warrant for the arrest of Klue as main suspect of the two attacks against the ANC in Brussels [De Morgen 3/10/88]. Therefore the journal 'De Morgen' [3/10/88] concluded that the State Police and GIA could have prevented the murder of Dulcie September, because only after this murder, the Belgian secret service informed the French colleagues about SA-agents in Brussels.

To day Joseph Klue lives in the Cape where he has a ostrich farm.

2. In Europe SA agents seemed to work with locals, especially rightwingers. Their "natural ally" in Belgium would be the Vlaams Blok (Flemish Block).

This Flemish party and its extremists front organisations as for example the former Vrienden van Zuid-Afrika (Friends of SA) & Voorpost (Outpost, the continuation of the banned paramilitary force VMO) are violent, racist, anti-migrants, pro-apartheid and maintain good relations with white right-wing extremist groups in South Africa, as the AWB, the Afrikaner Volksfront/AVF & the Boerestaat Party. [information Hugo Gijssels].

Could it be that they were involved? It certainly would explain the blundering during the execution of the operations.

3. In the 70s François Richard Rouget (or Sanders) had been active in extreme right-wing movements like GUD ("Groupe Union Défense", a student union) and PFN ("Parti des Forces

Nouvelles"). Without completing his studies he entered the French Army. He left the army in 1984 with the rank of warrant officer ("sous lieutenant"). In June 1985 Rouget became, under the alias of Sanders, a mercenary officer of Bob Denard's Comorian Presidential Guard. In January 1987 he went to live in South Africa where he worked as a representative for two French companies: Essor Ingénierie (address at the time of the head office of the " Société Essor International Ingénierie"/SEII in France: 51 Quay de Valmy, Paris 10; the actual address of SEII seems to be: 63 Blvd. du Marechal Joffre, 92340 Bourg La Reine, France; tel. +33.1.40 91 12 47, fax: +33.1.46 83 95 85) and E.A. Export, ("Europe Afrique Export"; head office in France: 3 rue du Faubourg Saint-Honoré, Paris 8). In both companies his business partners and friends were two former mercenary officers of the above mentioned Presidential Guard: Jean-Claude Cabanac (alias "Barjac") of SEII and Christophe Chabassol at "Eurosept Associés", of which E.A. Export was a branch. Rouget travelled frequently between South Africa and Europe, making visits to places like Basel & Zürich; Lyon & Paris; Brussels and London. Officially concerning the export of steel to SA

Some background [Weinberg]: In 1978 the French mercenary Bob Denard established himself with a group of mercenaries in the Comoros where he became the head of the Guard of President Abdallah. Since September 1979 Denard worked not only with French secret services who had always backed him and monitored his activities, but also with South African agents. SA military intelligence and foreign affairs decided to start funding and training the Denard's PG in return to the permission to set up a secret listening station on the islands. A handful of SA agents slipped into the country and blended in with the Presidential Guard. Their job was to keep an ear on what was happening in the important ANC bases in Lusaka and Dar-es-Salaam and to monitor the war in Mozambique, in which SA was playing an active role. The Comoros were also used as a base for "sanctions-busting", particularly in arms. When in 1981 François Mitterrand was elected president Denard lost the support of the French intelligence service, but he managed to strengthen the link between SA and the Comoros. Between 1982 and 1989 the SA department of foreign affairs channelled through the Presidential Guard around R40 million in this country. Besides the Guard, Denard established his own company SOGECOM, which was in both the security and building business. He seemed to have made a lot of money. In 1985 Denard tried to raise the quality of the "European officers" (also the year Rouget had been recruited) but without much success. During the period 1985-87 the relationship of the PG with the majority of Comorians became worse. At the end of the 1980s the SAs didn't want to continue to prop up a mercenary regime and France also wanted to get rid of the mercenaries. Finally, also President Abdallah wanted the mercenaries to leave. Their response was a coup and the death of President Abdallah in which Bob Denard and his men were involved. SA suspended further assistance to the PG and all other forms of co-operation. The SA and the French government forced Denard and his mercenaries to leave the islands in 1989.

Taking into account the close relationships between the Comorian Presidential Guard and the South African intelligence services (MI), one can imagine that former mercenary officers as Rouget, Cabanac and Chabassol started working for South Africa, although officially being linked to French companies (or were these perhaps also SA front companies?) as Essor Ingénierie and E.A. Export.

This fits in with the information that Rouget allegedly directed a group doing reconnaissance missions on the ANC in Europe. [Non-Lieu:5]. The head of his group in Europe was Victor Paul Tramond. [Non-Lieu:7]. The liaison agent would have been Antonia Lucienne Soton, once Rouget's lover, and a former militant of the right wing movements "Occident" and "Jeune Europe". [Non-Lieu:6]. Paul Tramond (or "Victor") is an alias for Tran-Thuy Tuong born in Saigon (Vietnam) and a former militant of GUD, where he met Rouget in 1976 at the faculty of Assas in Paris. During the period 1985-87 he lived under the name Paul Tramond in Brussels, where he worked until December as a receptionist in Hotel Sheraton. The 22/12/87 he established himself in France with his girlfriend, a Belgian woman named Anne Lejeune who had found a job in France (address: 7

allée de Longchamp, Suresnes (92), tel. 40.99.05.98) [Non-Lieu:7]. According to information of the Belgian authorities Rouget staid two times at Sheraton in Brussels: the night of 6-7/12/87 and of 15-16/2/88 . This first "fiche d'hôtel" had been signed by Tramond, the only proof that Rouget and Tramond have met at least once [Non-Lieu:8].

At the time of the attempted attack on Motsepe (4/2/88) and the murder of DS (29/3/88), Rouget declared to have staid in South Africa. This could never been verified. However, Mrs. Soton told the police that she was with Rouget in the Comoros until the 29/2/88, the date of DS's murder...

4. Eeben Barlow: was a former commander (2nd in command) in SADF's 32 Battalion; served in Namibia; worked in 1983 in the office DCC (Directorate of Covert Collection), an MI agency; after being head of CCB operations in Western Europe he became in 1991 Executive Outcomes (a mercenary organisation) managing director.

Eeben Barlow seems to deny the responsibility for the murder of Dulcie September. An informant told me that Barlow allegedly once received an order to kill Dulcie September, but that his section refused because DS wasn't a military target.

Amsterdam Jan. 1997

Sources:

a) official documents:

- Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris - Cabinet de Mme Forkel (Juge d'Instruction): Ordonnance de Non-Lieu; Réf. générale No. P 88 102 2006/3; Réf. du cabinet no. 629. Paris 17/7/1992. ( Official declaration concerning the murder of Dulcie September with a summary of the results of the investigation, concluding that no sufficient evidence was found to take suspects into custody) [Non-Lieu]

b) other documents

- Black, Ian: "Britain exposes South African spy chief. Kicked Out", Daily Express 16/12/82

(about J. Klue) [Black]

- Case Dulcie September, 3rd version, NIZA: Amsterdam July 1997 [September]

- CV of General Marius Oelschig [CV Oelschig]

- Daniel, John: Notes on the CCB and Vlakplaas based on a Discussion with Stephen Ellis, Amsterdam, June 13, 1996 with corrections/additions from Stephen Ellis [Int.Ellis]

- Document 'Godfrey & Dulcie'[G&D-doc]

- Kent, Peter & Black, Ian: "Secret army of spy who lured British troops", Daily Express, 17/12/82

(about J. Klue) [Kent]

-De Morgen: 28-3, 29-3, 29-4, 30-4, 31-3, 2-5, 18-6, 24-6, 25-6, 3-10 en 26-10/1988, 16-8-96[DM]

- Le Soir 17/8/96

- De Standaard: 12-2, 30-4, 20-6 en 24-6/1988, 16-8-96 [DS]
- Sapa-AFP 17/8/96
- The Citizen: 16/8/96
- Pauw, Jacques; In the heart of the whore. The story of apartheid's death squads; Halfway House: Southern Book Publishers, 1991:207-208,281 [Pauw] - Roth, Jürgen; Die Mitternachtsregierung. Reportage über die Macht der Geheimdienste; ?: Rasch und Röhring Verlag, 1990: 22-27 & 38-68 [Roth] -West Africa [WA 1/8/88]
- Intel/PP [Intel]: 88-05 (12-14); 88-07; 88-08 (104)
- SouthScan vol 2. no.28, 30-3-88 [SS-28]
- Weinberg, Samantha: Last of the Pirates. The Search for Bob Denard; London: Jonathan Cape, 1994 [Weinberg]

### **The (secret) Truth Commission Files**